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Foreign meddling in the 2016 presidential election—from Russian 
hacking and leaking of Democratic National Committee emails to the 
foreign power’s dissemination of fake news and other disruptive falsehoods 
on major social media platforms—deeply impacted the coverage of and 
campaigning by the candidates. Even if this sophisticated disinformation 
operation ultimately did not change the outcome of the election, it raises 
serious concerns about the vulnerability of our electoral democracy to 
foreign interference and basic questions about the nature and extent of 
First Amendment protection for speech from abroad, including from 
speakers affiliated with hostile foreign countries. 
While the First Amendment generally does not protect foreign speakers 
outside of the United States, the openness of the internet to speech from 
abroad and the power of vast social networking platforms to spread such 
speech call for fresh consideration of First Amendment coverage on the 
listener’s end of the speech relationship. This Article does that. First, it 
examines the extent to which existing caselaw on the right to receive 
information and ideas either already protects or might extend to safeguard 
access to speech from abroad by foreign sources. Next, it considers how 
traditional justifications for protecting domestic speech—truth-seeking, 
self-governance, and self-realization—generally support open access to 
foreign speech, and possibly even to disinformation from hostile nations in 
the high stakes context of elections. Finally, this Article recommends 
disclosure of the identity of foreign-state speakers and early education to 
instill media literacy as policy responses to foreign meddling in the 
domestic marketplace of ideas that are consonant with both First 
Amendment doctrine and functions. 
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I. Introduction 
Those of us who came of age watching movies in the 1980s expected 
certain things of the future. Foremost, we would have flying cars, even if 
time-traveling in them were not possible or advisable.
1
 Second, a slasher 
might kill us in our sleep.
2
 While these two scenarios may have played—
none too seriously—to our collective adolescent optimism and anxieties, a 
third possibility loomed at the edge of reality during the peak of the Cold 
War: a Russian invasion.
3
 Well, it’s 2018, and we still don’t have flying 
cars,
4
 Freddy Krueger has not done us in,
5
 and the Russians have not 
come—at least not by land, sea, or air. Instead, during the 2016 presidential 
campaign, the Russians invaded with words. 
The Russians. Unprecedented, sophisticated, and still disputed in the 
highest quarters,
6
 the full breadth and depth of Russian efforts to influence 
the outcome of the 2016 presidential election and sow social discord in the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985). 
 2. See A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line Cinema 1984). 
 3. See RED DAWN (MGM/UA 1984). 
 4. But see Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber’s ‘Flying Cars’ Could Arrive in LA by 2020—
And Here’s What It’ll Be Like to Ride One, VERGE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.theverge. 
com/2017/11/8/16613228/uber-flying-car-la-nasa-space-act. 
 5. But see A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line Cinema 2010). 
 6. See Angie Drobnic Holan, 2017 Lie of the Year: Russian Election Interference is a 
‘Made-Up Story,” POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2017, 6:30 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2017/dec/12/2017-lie-year-russian-election-interference-made-s/. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10
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 and law enforcement 
investigations.
11
 Leading U.S. intelligence agencies such as the CIA and 
FBI have already concluded with “high confidence” that President Vladimir 
Putin authorized a Russian influence campaign to “undermine public faith 
in the US democratic process,” “harm [Hillary Clinton’s] electability and 
potential presidency,” and “help [Donald] Trump’s election chances” by 
“discrediting . . . Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to 
him.”
12
 As part of a multifaceted campaign, Russian intelligence operatives 
and affiliated individuals hacked Democratic National Committee email 
accounts and shared large volumes of potentially damaging content with 
Wikileaks and other outlets for public disclosure;
13
 employed Russian-
owned cable and online outlets RT and Sputnik to cast Clinton negatively 
and Trump positively in news coverage laced with disinformation and to 
disseminate propaganda critical of U.S. democracy;
14
 and employed a 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See, e.g., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian 
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident 
Attribution, NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/ 
files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S. Election: Complete Coverage 
of Russia’s Campaign to Disrupt the 2016 Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
 9. See, e.g., Andrew Guess et al., Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from 
the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, EUROPEAN RES. 
COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf. 
 10. See, e.g., Brandon Carter, Trump Asked Senate Republicans to End Russia Election 
Interference Investigation, HILL (Nov. 30, 2017, 9:00 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/ 
administration/362708-trump-asked-senate-republicans-to-end-russia-election-interference; 
Mike Memoli & Marianna Sotomayor, House Intelligence Committee Ends Russia Probe 
with Party-line Vote: Democrats Vow to Continue Investigation After GOP Votes Out a 
Report That Finds No Collusion, NBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.nbc 
news.com/politics/congress/house-intelligence-committee-ends-russia-probe-party-line-vote-
n859126. 
 11. See, e.g., Kara Scannell et al., Mueller Indicts 13 Russian Nationals over 2016 
Election Interference, CNN (Feb. 17, 2018, 4:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/16/ 
politics/mueller-russia-indictments-election-interference/index.html; Abigail Tracy, Donald 
Trump’s Mueller Nightmare Is Coming True, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 17, 2018, 11:54 AM), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/donald-trump-robert-mueller-steve-bannon. 
 12. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at ii. 
 13. See Raphael Satter, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats’ Emails, AP 
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/dea73efc01594839957c3c9a6c962b8a. 
 14. See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at 3–4, 6–12; Jim 
Rutenberg, RT, Sputnik and Russia’s New Theory of War, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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multitude of fake social media accounts, bot networks, and trolls to spread 
false and inflammatory news stories, ads, and posts from seemingly real 
individuals and organizations inside the United States.
15
 Furthermore, when 
similarly sensational and slanted stories were fabricated by other speakers 
inside
16
 and outside the United States
17
 for financial or partisan gain, 
Russian-affiliated bots and trolls would amplify their popularity and online 
reach as part of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign.
18
 
Russia’s social media operations illustrate the sophistication and breadth 
of this campaign of electoral influence and social division. For example, 
leveraging Facebook’s advanced algorithms to target ads based on the 
platform’s deep knowledge of individual users, a Russian-linked company 
using fake accounts reached an estimated ten million people in the United 
States with ads spreading false and inflammatory stories, videos, and other 
posts attacking Clinton, supporting Trump, or playing to both sides 
(depending on the sympathies of the recipients) on hot-button issues such as 
policing, race, immigration, LGBT rights, and gun control—all for just 
$100,000.
19
 That so little money could spread Kremlin messaging so far 
                                                                                                                 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theory-
of-war.html. 
 15. See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at 10–11; Massimo 
Calabresi, Inside Russia’s Social Media War on America, TIME (May 18, 2017), 
http://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-media-war-america/; John Kruzel, Russia’s 
Social Media Efforts in 2016 Were Not Just False but Inflammatory, POLITIFACT (Dec. 21, 
2017, 10:23 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/dec/21/russia-social-
media-2016-false-inflammatory/; Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to 
Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/ 
us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html; Leslie Shapiro, Anatomy of a Russian 
Facebook Ad, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/ 
business/russian-ads-facebook-anatomy/. 
 16. See Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, to Hashtag, to Gunfire in D.C., 
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-
to-hashtag-to-gunfire-in-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story. 
html. 
 17. See Samantha Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED 
(Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/. 
 18. See Shane, supra note 15; see also Natalia V. Osipova & Aaron Byrd, Inside 
Russia’s Network of Bots and Trolls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2z2TIHb. 
 19. See Michelle Castillo, $100,000 in Russian-Bought Facebook Ads Could Have 
Reached Millions of Voters, CNBC (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/29/ 
russian-facebook-ads-how-many-people-could-you-reach-with-100000.html; Katie Reilly, 
Facebook Says 10 Million People in the U.S. Saw Russia-Linked Ads, TIME (Oct. 3, 2017), 
http://time.com/4966438/facebook-russia-linked-ads-election/; Scott Shane, These Are the 
Ads Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10
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evidences not only successful targeting, but also an extensive and 
coordinated campaign to amplify the reach of these ads through likes, 
shares, and comments from fake accounts.
20
 For its part, Twitter has 
recently disclosed that it has discovered more than 50,000 Russian-linked 
accounts that, through bots and trolls, exposed nearly 700,000 Americans to 
Kremlin election propaganda during the 2016 election cycle.
21
 
Whether this Russian disinformation campaign managed to sway the 




 Whatever consensus 
might eventually emerge on this question—if any will at all
24
—it seems 
safe to assume that the “new normal” is that Russia, if not other foreign 
                                                                                                                 
nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/russia-2016-election-facebook.html; Scott Shane & 
Vindu Goel, Fake Russian Facebook Accounts Bought $100,000 in Political Ads, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-
political-ads.html. In one vivid example of Russia stirring both sides of a hot-button social 
issue, it set up one fake group on Facebook called Heart of Texas, which announced a rally 
to “Stop Islamization of Texas” in Houston, and another fake group called United Muslims 
of America, which called for a counter-demonstration. Fake calls to action such as these 
reportedly yielded about 62,500 RSVPS. See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Russians 
Got Tens of Thousands of Americans to RSVP for Their Phony Political Events on 




 20. See Shapiro, supra note 15. 
 21. See Sam Machkovech, Twitter Begins Emailing the 677,775 Americans Who Took 
Russian Election Bait, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://arstechnica.com/ 
information-technology/2018/01/twitter-begins-emailing-the-677775-americans-who-took-
russian-election-bait/. John Cornyn, the second-most senior Republican in the Senate, 
admitted to having interacted with such Russian propaganda on Twitter. See Brandon Carter, 
Twitter Informs Cornyn He Interacted with Russia-Linked Content During 2016 Election, 
HILL (Jan. 20, 2018, 4:05 PM) http://thehill.com/policy/technology/369943-twitter-informs-
cornyn-he-interacted-with-russia-linked-content-during-2016. 
 22. See, e.g., Guess et al., supra note 9; see also Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, 
Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2017, at 211, 
https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf. 
 23. Compare, e.g., Warren Strobel, CIA’s Pompeo Asserts Russian Meddling Did Not 
Sway U.S. Election Result, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2017, 8:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-trump-russia/cias-pompeo-asserts-russian-meddling-did-not-sway-u-s-election 
-result-idUSKBN1CP028, with Graham Lanktree, Did Trump Really Win the Election?, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2017, 4:11 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/did-trump-really-win-
election-703431. 
 24. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing 
that “we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s 
Presidential election”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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adversaries as well, will expand on this playbook to meddle in future 
elections and attempt to sow further discord among the electorate with 
weaponized words from abroad.
25
  
The Court. While the Russians to date have not directed their influence 
campaign at the judiciary, case law seems to have aligned in support of a 
robust right to receive foreign speech. Over the course of a century, and 
accelerating under the Roberts Court, precedents have given increasing 
substance and scope to a First Amendment right to receive information and 
ideas. By language and logic, if not always by express holdings, these 
decisions offer fair to firm support for a right extensive enough to protect 
domestic access to speech from foreign speakers and even hostile foreign 
governments, and strong enough to cast doubt on the constitutionality of 
restricting access to foreign speech—even if such speech may promote 
falsehoods in the electoral context.  
Furthermore, while the sovereign power of the federal government may 
still give it some leeway to deny entry at the border to speech and speakers 
from abroad, the digitization and globalization of speech on the internet has 
made physical border restrictions largely irrelevant. Touching on this mass 
migration of expression onto the internet, the Court’s online speech cases 
have made clear that the Court may be as vigilantly protective of speech in 
cyberspace as it is of speech in traditional public forums. In short, foreign 
speech has never been more abundant or accessible to domestic listeners, 
and the listeners’ right to receive it has never been more robust as a matter 
of First Amendment doctrine.  
Russia’s influence campaign and the Court’s free speech jurisprudence 
are thus on course to either collude or collide. This Article will attempt to 
sort out which. As background, Part II will set out the different 
constitutional statuses of foreign speakers inside and outside the United 
States, with the former enjoying some First Amendment protection and the 
latter enjoying none. Part III will trace the century-long doctrinal 
development of what Justice Marshall has referred to as the other side of 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at 5; see Nicole Gaouette, U.S. 
Must Act Now to Ward Off More Russian Election Meddling, Report Says, CNN (Jan. 10, 
2018), http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/10/politics/us-russia-election-meddling-cardin-report/ 
index.html; Miles Parks, 5 Ways Election Interference Could (and Probably Will) Worsen in 
2018 and Beyond, NPR (Jan. 27, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/27/ 
579683042/5-ways-election-interference-could-and-probably-will-worsen-in-2018-and-
beyond; Matthew Rosenberg et al., Russia Sees Midterm Elections as Chance to Sow Fresh 
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the coin of the right to speak—the right to receive information and ideas—
and its remarkable solidification under the Roberts Court. Although the 
Court has not said in so many words that this right to access an open 
marketplace of ideas, unfiltered by speaker, speech value, or perhaps even 
veracity, extends generally to all speech from abroad, its judicial opinions 
strongly suggest so. Part IV will then consider whether this precedential 
conclusion is consistent with the commonly agreed upon functions of the 
First Amendment—promoting the search for truth, democratic self-
governance, and self-realization—concluding with some caveats that it is. 
Finally, among the various policy proposals responding to the perceived 
threat that the online spread of disinformation poses to democracy, Part V 
recommends pursuing at least two that may be both effective and consonant 
with First Amendment doctrine and functions: identifying and disclosing 
speech affiliated with foreign nations, and promoting education in media 
literacy from an early age. 
II. The First Amendment Rights of Foreign Speakers 
Whether foreign speakers can invoke the protections of the First 
Amendment generally depends on whether they are physically inside or 
outside the United States.  
Inside, foreign speakers appear to enjoy much—perhaps nearly all—of 
the freedom of speech that American citizens do. As a general matter, the 
Court has long recognized that “once an alien lawfully enters and resides in 
this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”
26
 Indeed, over half a century ago, the Court declared that 
“[f]reedom of speech and of the press is accorded aliens residing in this 
country.”
27
 Consistent with this recognition, the Court has since confirmed 
that aliens inside the country “enjoy certain constitutional rights,” including 
“First Amendment rights.”
28
 The Court has not decided or suggested that 
the First Amendment rights enjoyed by aliens lawfully residing within the 
United States are less extensive than those enjoyed by U.S. citizens.
29
  
                                                                                                                 
 26. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. 
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring)). 
 27. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148 (majority opinion). 
 28. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270, 271 (1990). 
 29. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s textual argument that the First Amendment 
protects “the people,” including aliens who are “part of the national community” because of 
their “sufficient connection with this country,” see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text, 
implies that the free speech rights of lawful resident aliens and U.S. citizens are 
coterminous. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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In contrast, outside the United States, foreign speakers would be hard 
pressed to claim any First Amendment protection for themselves. While the 
Court and scholars have assumed that “First Amendment protections reach 
beyond our national boundaries” for U.S. citizens abroad, restricting the 
ability of the government to burden citizens’ expressive activities outside 
the United States,
30
 the Court has neither held nor assumed that foreign 
speakers abroad enjoy any First Amendment protection. Indeed, at least a 
plurality on the Court has assumed the opposite. 
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion held that the rights of “the people” protected by the text of 
the Fourth Amendment do not extend outside the United States to non-
citizens.
31
 They are not the “class of persons who are part of a national 
community or . . . have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community.”
32
 Of particular relevance 
here, the plurality noted that the text of the First and Second Amendments 
similarly extend their protections to—and only to—“the people.”
33
 In his 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy disavowed this textual limitation on the reach 
of those amendments, instead arguing that “general principles of 
interpretation” must decide the applicability and extent of the constitutional 
restrictions the United States “must observe with reference to aliens beyond 
its territory.”
34
 But neither Justice Kennedy nor any other Justice has since 
suggested that the First Amendment’s protections extend generally to 
foreigners outside the United States.  
At most, Boumediene v. Bush cracked the door for aliens outside the 
United States to raise constitutional claims regarding the legality or 
conditions of their confinement.
35
 There, the Court through Justice Kennedy 
held that the Constitution’s prohibition against suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus applied to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where alien terrorism 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981); cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) 
(“When the government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the 
Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should 
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); see Timothy Zick, 
Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1593 (2010) (“Extension of First Amendment protections to 
U.S. citizens located abroad would seem to be supported by text, theory, and precedent.”). 
 31. 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990). 
 32. Id. at 265. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 35. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10
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detainees sought to invoke the writ to challenge their detention.
36
 But the 
Court underscored that its decision “does not address the content of the 
law”—including any constitutional claim—“that governs petitioners’ 
detention,” which is “a matter yet to be determined.”
37
  
Even if any of the substantive protections of the Constitution might 
arguably protect aliens to some extent at Guantanamo Bay, the Court’s 
recognition of that possibility turned in large part on Guantanamo Bay’s 
unique status as a territory over which the United States exercises “de facto 
sovereignty” by virtue of its “complete jurisdiction and control over the 
base.”
38
 Similarly, in Hernandez v. Mesa,
39
 the Court confronted but 
ultimately avoided the question of whether the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection would extend to a foreign citizen shot and killed by a U.S. border 
patrol agent standing on the opposite side of a shared culvert across which 
ran the U.S.-Mexican border. Justice Breyer, however, argued in his dissent 
that, consistent with Boumediene, “practical concerns” such as the shared 
physical features and administration of this “special border-related area” 
established that the culvert had “sufficient involvement with, and 




Given the sui generis characteristics of the territories at issue in 
Boumediene and Hernandez, it is highly doubtful—and, at best, not 
foreclosed—that, as a matter of doctrine, the protections of the First 
Amendment would extend generally to foreigners outside of the territorial 
United States. Neither have scholars seriously argued for such an extension 
of the First Amendment.
41
 Instead, if First Amendment protection is to 
extend to speech from foreign speakers outside of the United States, it must 
find its precedential footing elsewhere. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 771. 
 37. Id. at 798. 
 38. Id. at 754. 
 39. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 40. Id. at 2009, 2011 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 41. Compare Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 
OKLA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2018) (“Foreign speakers may not have any autonomy interests 
protected by the First Amendment . . . .”), with Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial 
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 288 (2009) (observing that 
the “functional approach” taken by Boumediene “do[es] not require the categorical denial of 
extraterritorial free speech rights either to citizens or to foreign nationals”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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III. The Right to Receive (Foreign) Information and Ideas 
Given that the sparse case law and scholarship are generally dismissive 
of First Amendment protection for foreign speakers abroad, it is useful to 
take stock of the extent to which their speech is already shielded by existing 
doctrine independent of the geographic location and national identity of the 
speaker. The most pertinent First Amendment principle, and potentially the 
most protective of foreign speech, is the right to receive information and 




Scholars have acknowledged the existence of a right to receive 
information and ideas for decades,
43
 and lower courts as well as scholars 
have recently focused on the application of that right in the context of video 
recording.
44
 But the development and contours of a right to receive 
information and ideas have not received extensive treatment in either 
judicial decisions or scholarly literature.
45
 Nor has discussion of the right 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Professors Massaro and Norton analogously explore the First Amendment interest in 
protecting the speech of robots, who themselves may enjoy rights as speakers, based on the 
“First Amendment value [of their speech] to human listeners.” Toni M. Massaro & Helen 
Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 
1178 (2016). 
 43. See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA 145 (1973) (discussing a First Amendment focus on the listener as 
“a pioneering concept which is not yet fully developed or understood”); MARTIN H. REDISH, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 47 (1984) (noting that, to further the self-
realization function of the First Amendment, “the individual needs an uninhibited flow of 
information and opinion to aid him or her in making life-affecting decisions, in governing 
his or her own life”). 
 44. See, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 
2017) (noting agreement among circuit courts that “the First Amendment protects the 
recording of officials’ conduct in public” and recognizing that “the First Amendment 
provides at least some degree of protection for gathering news and information” (first citing 
Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2017) and then quoting ACLU of Ill. v. 
Alvarez, 769 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012)); Marc Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the 
First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 85–109 (2015) (considering the 
contours of a First Amendment right to record and gather information “on the ground and in 
the air”); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2016) (arguing that “video recording is a form of expression or at 
the very least, is conduct that serves as a necessary precursor of expression such that it 
counts as speech under the First Amendment”). 
 45. See Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive 
Information, 2 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 223, 230 (1999) (noting that, “[d]espite its importance, 
the right to receive information remains a relatively unexplored aspect of the freedom of 
speech” both in case law and in scholarship). 
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caught up with the exceptionally broad, robust free speech decisions of the 
Roberts Court. This Part fills the gap in the literature by tracing the 
development of the right to receive information and ideas across key 
Supreme Court precedents. 
A. Establishing the Right to Receive Information and Ideas 
Stanley. A good starting place to survey the size and shape of the right to 
receive information and ideas is Stanley v. Georgia, the 1969 case that 
declared the right to be “now well established.”
46
 Stanley overturned a 
conviction for in-home possession of obscenity, which was one of the 
“well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech”
47
 that the Court had 
reaffirmed a decade earlier as falling outside the protection of the First 
Amendment for being “utterly without redeeming social importance.”
48
 
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Stanley Court declared that 
the “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social 
worth, . . . is fundamental to our free society.”
49
 The Court explained that 
this First Amendment liberty encompasses the right “to read or observe 
what [one] pleases,” and that it gains “an added dimension” when exercised 
“in the privacy of a person’s own home.”
50
 In the home, the right to privacy 
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut as a freedom from government 
intrusion
51
 fortifies the right to receive information and ideas to such an 
extent that the state’s “broad power to regulate obscenity” is wholly 
curtailed.
52
 The state consequently has “no business telling a man, sitting 
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 




Pierce and Meyer. In addition to leveraging Griswold, the Stanley Court 
cited a handful of cases to lend substance to the right to receive information 
and ideas and to support its statement that the right was well-established. 
Oldest among them was Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which in 1925 
                                                                                                                 
 46. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
 47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 48. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 49. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
 50. Id. at 564, 565. 
 51. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 52. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568; cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s treatment and definition of obscenity as a 
category of unprotected speech, stating that “the right to know is the corollary of the right to 
speak or publish”). 
 53. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
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recognized the constitutional right of parents to educate their children 
outside the confines of state-run public schools.
54
 Pierce, along with Meyer 
v. Nebraska, which in 1923 invalidated an English-only teaching 
requirement for public and private schools,
55
 established that “the State may 
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the 
spectrum of available knowledge.”
56
 Such an unconstitutional contraction 
could occur not only on the giving end (abridging “the right to utter or to 
print”), but also, as these early cases illustrate, on the receiving end 
(abridging “the right to receive, the right to read”).
57
 Moreover, the right to 
receive is broad enough to encompass the freedom of parents to have their 
children acquire knowledge of “foreign tongues and ideals”—even those of 
a nation recently at war with the United States.
58
  
Lamont. While Meyer recognized that the “spectrum of available 
knowledge”
59
 protected by the First Amendment extends to foreign 
information and ideas, the case only implicated speakers within the United 
States—teachers of “German, French, Spanish, Italian, and every other 
alien speech.”
60
 But a second decision cited by the Court in Stanley, the 
1965 case of Lamont v. Postmaster General,
61
 made clear that the right to 
which it referred also extends to information and ideas disseminated by 
speakers abroad.  
In Lamont, the Court struck down a federal statute directing the 
Postmaster General to detain “communist political propaganda” that “is 
printed or otherwise prepared in a foreign country,” to notify the addressee 
that the material was received, and to deliver it only upon the addressee’s 
request.
62
 The statute incorporated the meaning of “political propaganda” 
from the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, which defined the term 
broadly to encompass any expressive material intended to “influence a 
recipient . . . with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or 
relations” of a foreign country; any speech promoting “racial, social, 
political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use 
of force or violence”; and any advocacy for “the overthrow of any 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 564 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
 55. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 56. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. The petitioner had been convicted under the Nebraska 
statute for teaching German in a parochial school. See id. at 396. 
 59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
 60. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
 61. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 62. Id. at 302. 
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government” within the United States by “force or violence.”
63
 Though the 
barrier to receipt of this extensive class of speech from abroad could be 
lifted by an addressee simply returning a notice card, the Court through 
Justice Douglas unhesitatingly found the “limitation on the unfettered 
exercise of the addressee’s First Amendment rights” to be “at war with the 
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate and discussion that are 
contemplated by the First Amendment.”
64
 The government could not, 
consistent with the freedom of speech, “control the flow of ideas to the 
public” even in this limited and pregnable fashion, and even with respect to 




The concurring opinion by Justice Brennan, which was cited in Stanley,
66
 
made explicit that the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” marketplace of 
ideas to which the Lamont majority referred (quoting his landmark opinion 
for the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
67
) necessarily includes “the 
right to receive” speech.
68
 “The dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing,” he wrote, “if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive 
and consider them,” leaving “a barren marketplace of ideas that had only 
sellers and no buyers.”
69
 In the face of this essential relationship between 
the free speech rights of speakers and recipients, the government’s asserted 
interest in protecting “the unwilling recipient” from potentially offensive 
speech cannot trump the right of other audience members to receive it 
where a ready self-help remedy (for instance, requesting that the Post 
Office block such material) could “fully safeguard[]” their sensibilities.
70
  
Martin. Supporting Justice Brennan’s points and completing Stanley’s 
citation list is Martin v. City of Struthers, where the Court invalidated a 
municipal ban on door-to-door distribution of handbills, circulars, and 
advertisements.
71
 The Court explained that the “broad scope” of the 
freedom of speech “embraces the right to distribute literature and 
necessarily protects the right to receive it.”
72
 Both are so “clearly vital to 
the preservation of a free society” that any “naked restriction of the 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 302 n.1 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 64. Id. at 305, 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 65. Id. at 306. 
 66. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. 
 67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 68. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 310. 
 71. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
 72. Id. at 143 (internal citation omitted). 
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dissemination of ideas” on either end cannot stand where “traditional legal 
methods” can address any purported “dangers of distribution.”
73
 As 
examples, the Court cited trespass-after-warning statutes and similar laws 
that “leave[] the decision as to whether distributors of literature may 
lawfully call at a home where it belongs—with the homeowner.”
74
  
In sum, piecing together Stanley and the cases it collects under the rubric 
of the right to receive information and ideas, a picture emerges of the nature 
and extent to which that right was recognized. First, it can be said that 
Stanley’s view of the right as “now well established” was not a stretch.
75
 In 
multiple cases, across different decades and contexts, the Court invoked 
that right to strike down regulations that interfered with the ability of 
individuals to receive speech.
76
 Second, the right protects speech regardless 
of the subject or viewpoint. Indeed, the right even extended to speech 
advocating violent overthrow (Lamont) and, at least with reinforcement 
from the right to privacy in the home, to speech that otherwise lacked 
sufficient social worth to warrant First Amendment protection (Stanley). 
Third, the right to receive information and ideas operated prophylactically, 
preventing the government from restraining speech distribution on a 
wholesale basis in order to protect potentially unwilling listeners who 
themselves possessed the power to block receipt on an individual basis 
(Lamont and Martin). Fourth, and most significantly for the subject of this 
Article, the right to receive information and ideas did not seem to depend 
on either the nationality of the speaker or the geographic origin of the 
speech. The right had secured uninhibited access to foreign speakers from 
both inside (Meyer) and outside (Lamont) the country, from humble foreign 
language teachers to hostile foreign powers. 
B. Limiting the Right to Receive Information and Ideas at the Borders 
The broad and robust right to receive information and ideas delineated 
above well served the Stanley Court’s substantive end: striking down the 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 146–47. 
 74. Id. at 148. 
 75. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
 76. In addition to the cases cited or discussed in Stanley, a handful of other pre-Stanley 
decisions directly or indirectly reference the right to receive information and ideas. See, e.g., 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (in upholding FCC’s “fairness 
doctrine,” observing that “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here”); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (invalidating registration requirement for soliciting union 
membership as both a restriction on “right to speak” of labor organizers as well as “rights of 
the workers to hear”). 
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application of the obscenity statute to in-home consumption of expressive 
material. But the right was drawn incompletely in a number of important 
respects, and subsequently limited at the borders by Court majorities with 
less expansive views of the right.  
For starters, with one exception, neither Stanley nor the cases on which it 
relied suggested any specific or significant limits on the reach of the right. 
The exception was Stanley’s acknowledgement that the state’s “broad 
power” to regulate obscenity—and, presumably, other historically 
unprotected categories of speech
77
—is not disturbed outside of the home, 
where the right to receive information and ideas is not commingled with 
“an added dimension” of the right to privacy.
78
 Apart from this exception, 
the right to receive information and ideas at Stanley’s time seemed to 
extend as far as the right to utter or print them, with “buyers and sellers” 
deemed equally essential for a functioning marketplace of ideas.
79
  
But even viewing the right to receive information and ideas as co-
dependent and co-extensive with the right to speak, some limits suggest 
themselves. Most basically, just as the First Amendment famously would 
not protect a speaker “shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,”
80
 the 
right to receive information and ideas surely is not absolute either. A 
listener in a crowded theater could not insist on a right to hear someone 
shouting “fire.” Other easy examples come to mind. For instance, just as 
one could not claim a First Amendment right to break into someone else’s 
home to speak to them,
81
 one would not enjoy the right to break into 
someone’s home to listen to them speak.  
More significantly, the federal government’s historically broad power to 
control the movement of materials and people at the national border can 
conflict directly with an unlimited right to receive information and ideas 
from abroad. The Court has repeatedly recognized the “long-standing right 
of the sovereign to protect itself” against the entry of harmful items and 
individuals.
82
 Consequently, the Court has time and again upheld 
warrantless border searches and seizures against Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 80. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 81. See Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972) (“[T]his Court has never 
held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on 
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”). 
 82. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 619 (1977). 
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12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film. First Amendment challenges to 
the denial of entry have not fared well either, even in the wake of Stanley 
and Lamont. For example, in 1973, the Court through Chief Justice Burger 
upheld the application of the Tariff Act of 1930, which banned the 
importation of “obscene or immoral” materials,
84
 to the border seizure of 
sexually explicit films, slides, photographs, and prints from Mexico.
85
 
Responding to the contention that Stanley prevented the government from 
restricting the transportation of obscenity “for private, personal use and 
possession only”—including the importation of obscenity from abroad—the 
Court first noted that “[i]mport restrictions and searches of persons or 
packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and 
different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”
86
 With 
respect to packages and other items, those “different considerations and 
different rules” derive from “the complete power of Congress over foreign 
commerce” pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and its 
consequent “plenary power . . . to regulate imports.”
87
 The Court curtly 
limited and distinguished Stanley on the ground that “Stanley’s emphasis 
was on the freedom of thought and mind in the privacy of the home,” and 
that “a port of entry is not a traveler’s home.”
88
 The Court made no mention 
of the right to receive information and ideas, even though Stanley, in 
reinforcing the right within the home, had recognized it as “well 
established” outside of the home.  
Mandel and R.A.V. As with expressive items, so too with individuals 
seeking entry to address domestic audiences. Most notably, in the 1972 case 
of Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court upheld the exclusion of a Belgian who 
sought a non-immigrant visa to participate in academic conferences and 
give lectures across the country.
89
 The foreigner speaker, Ernest Mandel, 
was a self-described “revolutionary Marxist” subject to the categorical 
exclusion of communists under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 616. 
 84. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2012). 
 85. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973). 
 86. Id. at 125. 
 87. Id. at 126 (quoting Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)). 
 88. Id. at 128–29 (internal quotation marks omitted). The quoted language comes from 
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, wherein a plurality of the Court had reached 
the same conclusion, albeit in dicta. See 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971). 
 89. 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
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1952 unless granted a waiver by the Attorney General on the 
recommendation of the Secretary of State.
90
 Mandel had entered the country 
twice before on waivers—once to work as a journalist and a second time to 
give speeches at universities—but this third time he was denied a waiver on 
the ground that his last visit had exceeded its stated purposes.
91
  
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court first foreclosed any 
possibility that Mandel himself could assert a First Amendment or other 
constitutional claim to entry. Starkly put, given “plenary congressional 
power” to regulate the entry of foreigners, “an unadmitted and nonresident 




With Mandel’s own claims foreclosed, the case presented the question 
whether the government’s exclusion violated the First Amendment right to 
receive information and ideas of the academics who had invited him to 
speak and joined in his lawsuit.
93
 The Court was not impressed with the 
government’s attempt to sidestep this free speech question with the 
argument that it had only limited “physical movement” into the country.
94
 
After all, the Court noted, Lamont also involved the government’s 
regulation of physical entry (there, of mail) into the country.
95
 Nor did the 
Court buy the government’s argument that the domestic audience members’ 
right to receive information and ideas was not burdened because they still 
had access to Mandel’s books and published speeches, as well as to 
recordings and telephonic communications.
96
 Drawing perhaps from its 
own individual and institutional experiences, the Court was “loath to hold” 
that such alternatives would extinguish an audience’s First Amendment 
interest in receiving information and ideas in person given the “particular 




                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 755, 756 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. at 756–57. He gave lectures at more universities than stated in his visa 
application and, contrary to the terms of his visa, appeared at an event where political 
contributions were solicited. See id. at 758 n.5. 
 92. Id. at 762, 769. 
 93. See id. at 754, 762. 
 94. Id. at 764. 
 95. Id. at 765. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. Justice Marshall explicitly drew on “the essential place of oral argument in this 
Court’s work” that “the availability to us of briefs and exhibits does not supplant.” Id. at 776 
n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Having recognized the burden on the right to receive information and 
ideas imposed by the government’s denial of entry to a foreign speaker, the 
Court nevertheless rejected the claim on the merits. On one hand, the Court 
again invoked the plenary power of Congress to regulate entry and “to 
exclude aliens altogether”—a “firmly established” power “inherent in 
sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and 
defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers.”
98
 On 
the other hand, the Court reasoned that the audience members’ First 
Amendment argument “would prove too much.”
99
 Either every domestic 
audience member’s claim would prevail, thereby rendering the historic 
power of the political branches to exclude aliens “a nullity,” or courts 
would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s First Amendment 
interests against the government’s interests as to each particular alien, 
“[t]he dangers and the undesirability” of such a judicial approach appearing 
“obvious” to the Court.
100
 Therefore, as long as the government offered a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for excluding an alien, the Court 
would neither “look behind” that justification “nor test it by balancing [the] 




In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that 
“established First Amendment law” compelled the opposite outcome.
102
 
Echoing Justice Brennan’s opinion in Lamont, Justice Marshall stressed that 
“the right to speak and hear—including the right to inform others and to be 
informed about public issues—are inextricably part of [the same] process” 
of public discussion protected by the First Amendment—“two sides of the 
same coin.”
103
 Furthermore, dismissing the unpalatable First Amendment 
approaches posited by the majority, Justice Marshall contended that the 
Court’s cases already settled on a different approach, prohibiting the 
government from restricting the advocacy of ideas, including communist 
doctrine, “divorced from incitement to imminent lawless action.”
104
 
Consequently, short of excluding incitement as narrowly defined in 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at 765, 766 (majority opinion) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 705 (1983)). 
 99. Id. at 768, 769. 
 100. Id. at 769. 
 101. Id. at 770. 
 102. Id. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 775. 
 104. Id. at 780. 
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 the government “may not selectively pick and 
choose which ideas it will let into the country.”
106
  
Together, 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film
107
 and Mandel permit 
the government to erect two kinds of barriers, different in substance and 
scope, to the entry of foreign items and individuals for expressive purposes. 
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film at least allows the government to stop 
the cross-border “flow of ideas to the public” when those ideas are obscene. 
In addition, if Stanley did not disturb the government’s “broad power” to 
regulate obscenity outside the home as a class of unprotected speech, then it 
presumably did not curtail the government’s power to regulate other 




Mandel seems to sweep much more broadly, permitting the exclusion of 
any foreign speaker regardless of the First Amendment status of the 
anticipated speech. Thus, as a precedential matter, it appears that the 
government’s historically plenary power to control the entry of items and 
individuals into the country might be fairly limited by the First Amendment 
when it comes to the former—items—but hardly limited, if at all, when it 
comes to the latter—individuals.  
The scope of any restrictions on the government’s power to control entry 
remains an open question in several significant respects. First, with respect 
to the import of expressive materials, do Lamont and 12 200-Ft. Reels of 
Super 8MM. Film cover the entire range of First Amendment outcomes? 
Possibly. Justice Douglas’s characteristically capacious rights language for 
the majority in Lamont lends itself to maximalist construction. Any 
restriction on the “unfettered exercise” of the right to receive information 
and ideas, even a temporary and pregnable one at the border, is arguably “at 
war” with the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” marketplace of ideas 
protected by the First Amendment.
109
 Indeed, the opinion notes that it was 
not “deal[ing] with the right of Customs to inspect material from abroad for 
contraband,” and that qualification can be read to suggest that the 
government’s power to restrict the importation of expressive materials from 
abroad is limited to the narrow categories of speech that the government 
                                                                                                                 
 105. 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
 106. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 780 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 107. It is no doubt possible to short form this case name further, but the name would then 
be less fun. 
 108. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 109. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964)). 
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can lawfully outlaw, such as obscenity and incitement, because they lie 
beyond the protection of the First Amendment.
110
 Domestic audiences are 
entitled to receive all other speech from abroad, even propaganda from 




This maximalist reading of Lamont is supported by Justice Brennan’s 
concurring opinion in that case, which refused to countenance even a 
“minor” restriction on the right to receive information and ideas from 
abroad on the ground that it would open the door to worse 
encroachments.
112
 His concurrence also read the First Amendment as 
barring the government from blocking foreign propaganda at the border.
113
 
In short, notwithstanding the government’s plenary power to regulate 
imports, it has no more constitutional authority to restrict foreign speech 
from reaching domestic audiences than it has to restrict the distribution of 
speech within its borders because of the First Amendment right of domestic 
audience members to receive both.  
Second, the Court’s subsequent decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 
might limit the government’s “plenary power” to exclude expressive 
materials and aliens seeking entry to speak to domestic listeners.
114
 Under 
R.A.V., the government may censor any kind of unprotected speech 
“because of [its] constitutionally proscribable content,” but may not 
suppress such speech for content-based reasons “unrelated to [its] 
distinctively proscribable content,” such as suppressing political viewpoints 
that the government disagrees with.
115
 If applied to the border, R.A.V. 
would allow the government to continue blocking speakers and speech to 
protect the country from the particular social harms associated with 
obscenity, incitement, and other kinds of unprotected speech, but would bar 
the government from denying entry to “drive certain ideas or viewpoints” 
unrelated to those harms “from the marketplace”—for example, to suppress 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. at 307. 
 111. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 112. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 113. See id. at 310 (“That the governments which originate this propaganda themselves 
have no equivalent guarantees only highlights the cherished values of our constitutional 
framework; it can never justify emulating the practice of restrictive regimes in the name of 
expediency.”). 
 114. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 115. Id. at 383, 384, 388 (italics omitted). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10
2018]       THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN SPEECH 289 
 
 
content critical of the United States or democracy.
116
 R.A.V. therefore 
strongly suggests that excluding aliens at the border based on the political 
viewpoints they would share with domestic listeners would not qualify as a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason under Mandel.
117
  
Keene. In Meese v. Keene, the Court upheld a provision of the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act of 1938 requiring foreign agents seeking to 
distribute “political propaganda” within the United States to file a copy 
with the Attorney General, report on the extent of the dissemination, and 
label the expressive material with certain information, including the identity 
of the foreign agent and the fact that the material is registered with the 
Department of Justice.
118
 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion distinguished 
Lamont on the ground that “the Act places no burden on protected 
expression,” as it “does not pose any obstacle” to domestic distribution of 
or access to the foreign political propaganda, but “simply require[s] the 
disseminators of such material to make additional disclosures that would 
better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.”
119
 As for 
the government’s designation of the material as “political propaganda”—
the same statutory definition that was adopted by the regulation at issue in 
Lamont, and which ranged from expressive materials intended to influence 
opinions about other countries to advocacy of civil riot and violent 
overthrow in the United States
120
—the Court asserted that the term is “a 
broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one.”
121
 Given this “neutral 
definition,” the majority concluded that any “constitutional concerns” with 




Justice Blackmun’s dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
called into question the majority’s neutral characterization of the “political 
propaganda” label. He noted that the Act grew out of the House Un-
American Activities Committee’s efforts to counter foreign agents and 
propaganda.
123
 Furthermore, he argued that the classification would both 
chill the dissemination of the regulated materials, as “individuals and 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 387 (internal quotations omitted). Though R.A.V. did not involve border 
crossings, the categorical language and logic of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion do not 
invite exception either. See id. at 383–90. 
 117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 118. 481 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1987). 
 119. Id. at 480. 
 120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 121. Keene, 481 U.S. at 483. 
 122. Id. at 485. 
 123. See id. at 487. 
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institutions are bound to calculate the risk of being associated with 
materials officially classified as propaganda,” and “reduce the effectiveness 
of the speech” that is disseminated through a label that “lessen[s] its 
credence with viewers.”
124
 Finally, he contended that such a “saddling” of 




In sum, after Stanley in 1969 declared the right to receive information 
and ideas “well established,” putting it on a seemingly equal footing with 
the right to speak, a series of border cases cast into doubt the reach and 
robustness of the right. At minimum, the traditional plenary power of the 
sovereign to exclude dangerous substances at the border permits it to block 
the importation of expressive material that domestic audience members 
cannot claim a right to receive because the content is obscene or otherwise 
lacking in First Amendment protection. Furthermore, even if the expressive 
material does not fall into a category of unprotected speech, the government 
may require that materials of a political nature from foreign governments 
and agents (that is, “political propaganda”) be disclosed in some fashion so 
that the public may be informed of its nature and source. Finally, the 
government may deny foreigners entry—including foreigners invited to 
speak to domestic audiences—without First Amendment constraint so long 
as it offers a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for doing so.
126
  
Importantly, however, because the reason upheld in Mandel involved 
violations of past visa conditions rather than speech-related reasons, it is not 
clear whether the wide berth the Court gave to the “firmly established” 
power of the government “to exclude aliens altogether”
127
 would allow it to 
deny aliens entry for anticipated speech that might be protected, but that the 
government views as dangerous—for example, because the speaker might 
spread “fake news”
128
 or other inimical foreign propaganda. The Mandel 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. at 491–92, 493. 
 125. Id. at 493. 
 126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 128. I use the term “fake news” throughout this article to refer to news stories that 
promote factual falsehoods for the purpose of misleading the listener. Cf. Allcott & 
Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 213–14 (defining “fake news to be news articles that are 
intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers,” but not “unintentional 
reporting mistakes,” “rumors,” “conspiracy theories,” “satire,” “false statements by 
politicians,” or “reports that are slanted or misleading but not outright false”). Commentators 
have validly criticized the continued use of this term because it “oversimplifies a very 
complex problem” and has been appropriated by politicians and partisans to undermine 
independent journalism by attaching the label to “any piece of information that [they] didn’t 
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Court’s unanimous recognition of the burden that the exclusion of foreign 
speakers imposed on the right of domestic audiences to receive their ideas, 
dispositive for the dissent but not the majority, at least indicates that a 
speech-related denial would present a closer question. And the Court’s 
subsequent decision in R.A.V. strongly suggests that the government indeed 
cannot bar speakers or speech (even unprotected) at the border based on its 
disagreement with the foreign message or viewpoint. 
C. Fortifying the Right to Receive Information and Ideas 
In the decades since cases such as Mandel, decisions involving 
expression as diverse as sexually explicit speech, school libraries, 
electioneering communications, prescription drug marketing, violent video 
games, crush videos, and military lies have tended to add further support 
and shape to the previously “well established” right to receive information 
and ideas. Several of these cases come from the highly speech-protective 
Roberts Court, which has vigorously fortified the right in all but name.  
1. Erogenous Zoning 
Cases upholding government authority to zone sexually explicit or 
indecent speech could be taken to further limit the right to receive 
information and ideas, extending the government’s authority to block entry 
into the marketplace of ideas physically beyond the border and topically 
beyond obscene or otherwise unprotected speech. In Young v. American 
Mini Theaters, for example, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
upheld a regulation zoning adult movie theaters away from residential 
neighborhoods partly on the ground that “few of us would march our sons 
and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified 
Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”
129
 Dissenting 
against the implication that popular opinion or perceived value determines 
how widely speech may be disseminated for the “few” who may have 
interest in receiving it, Justice Stewart responded that “[t]he guarantees of 
                                                                                                                 
like.” Hossein Derakhshan & Claire Wardle, Ban the Term ‘Fake News,” CNN (Nov. 27, 
2017, 3:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/ opinions/fake-news-and-disinformation-
opinion-wardle-derakhshan/index.html; see also Meg Kelly, President Trump Cries ‘Fake 
News,’ and the World Follows, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/06/president-trump-cries-fake-news-and-the-world-
follows/. For convenience’s sake, however, this Article uses the term in the sense described. 
 129. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
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the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such 
majoritarian limitations on individual liberty.”
130
  
Along similar lines, for a plurality in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 
Justice Stevens upheld the authority of the FCC to fine a radio station for 
broadcasting George Carlin’s non-obscene “Filthy Words” monologue in 
the afternoon, partly to protect children and unwilling adults from tuning in 
unwittingly.
131
 Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan in dissent decried the 
public’s loss of the “free[dom] to choose those communications worthy of 
its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor’s hand.”
132
  
Finally, subsequent cases made it even easier for the government to 
engage in “erogenous zoning”
133
 by treating asserted interests—such as 
mitigating crime and protecting property values—as content neutral and, 
therefore, subject only to intermediate scrutiny. A prime example of such 
treatment is Renton v. Playtime Theatre, where the Rehnquist Court found a 
zoning ordinance targeting adult movie theaters to be content neutral and 
constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.
134
  
The potential reductive impact of these cases on the right to receive 
information and ideas, if not entirely eliminated, has at least been blunted 
outside the context of physical zoning or broadcast media. Of particular 
relevance to this Article, the Court recently has come to treat the regulation 
of sexually explicit content in newer media as content based and therefore 
presumptively invalid under the more speech-protective strict scrutiny test. 
For instance, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court 
invalidated a federal requirement that cable operators fully scramble or 
block sexually oriented programming as a content-based restriction.
135
 The 
requirement failed strict scrutiny because less restrictive alternatives would 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 86. 
 131. 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978). 
 132. Id. at 772. Justice Brennan’s constitutional preference for consumers—including 
children—to choose which sexual information and ideas to accept or reject subsequently 
prevailed in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). Justice Marshall’s 
majority opinion recognized not only the right of parents to “truthful information bearing on 
their ability to discuss birth control and make informed decisions,” but also the “significant” 
First Amendment right of minors to receive information. Id. at 74, 74 n.30; see also id. at 79 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing that a ban on mailing unsolicited advertisements for 
contraceptives “den[ies] parents access to information about birth control that might help 
them make informed decisions”). 
 133. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 934 (2d ed. 1988). 
 134. 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986). 
 135. 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
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have left access to or blocking of such speech up to cable subscribers.
136
 
Contradicting the “few-of-us-would-march-our-sons-and-daughters” 
majoritarian justification in American Mini Theaters, and rejecting the 
paternalism of Pacifica, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion observed that 
“even with the mandate or approval of a majority,” the First Amendment 
“exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and 




Moreover, in Reno v. ACLU, Justice Stevens himself authored the 
majority opinion limiting the applicability of Pacifica to the “particular 
medium” of broadcasting, where “warnings could not adequately protect 
the listener from unexpected program content.”
138
 Setting aside Pacifica, 
the Court invalidated a federal ban on “indecent” and “patently offensive” 
online materials accessible to minors partly on First Amendment 
overbreadth grounds, concluding that the ban “effectively suppresses a 
large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and 
to address to one another.”
139
 And in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion applied Playboy to uphold a preliminary injunction against 
a federal ban on sexually oriented commercial online postings “harmful to 
minors.”
140
 The Court concluded that the regulation was likely to fail the 
least restrictive alternative prong of strict scrutiny, as filtering software 
might well be more effective at protecting children’s access to harmful 




2. Student Speech 
In the landmark student speech case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Court upheld the First Amendment right of 
students to wear armbands to protest the Vietnam War.
142
 Justice Fortas’s 
majority opinion also recognized that the rights of other students to receive 
the armband-wearing students’ speech were at stake, declaring, “In our 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See id. at 818–26. 
 137. Id. at 818. 
 138. 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997). 
 139. Id. at 874. Earlier, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., Justice Stevens also embraced “[t]he 
preservation of a full and free flow of information to the general public” as “a core objective 
of the First Amendment.” 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004). 
 141. Id. at 667. 
 142. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only 
that which the State chooses to communicate.”
143
 This right of students to 
receive information and ideas was reaffirmed forcefully in Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Board of Education, Island Trees Union 
Free School District v. Pico.
144
 In the lengthiest discourse to date on the 
right to receive information and ideas, Justice Brennan drew from cases 
such as Martin, Griswold, Stanley, Mandel, and Lamont and authorities 
ranging from Madison to Meiklejohn to demonstrate not only the 
established nature of “the right to receive ideas” as “an inherent corollary of 
the rights of free speech and press,”
145
 but also to ground the right in 
theoretical principles of self-governance.
146
 Accordingly, his plurality 
opinion held that school boards cannot remove books from their libraries 
“simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books,” as access 
to unorthodox ideas “prepares students for active and effective participation 
in a pluralistic society.”
147
  
3. The Roberts Court 
The Court’s increasing unwillingness to countenance limitations on 
marketplace access to protected speech reflects a modern trend toward 
greater speech protection that reaches new heights under the Roberts 
Court.
148
 The burgeoning and generally speech-protective free speech 
jurisprudence of the Roberts Court has fortified the right to receive 
information and ideas in a number of potentially significant ways for 
speech from abroad.  
Citizens United and Bluman. Perhaps most consequentially, a majority of 
the Roberts Court in Citizens United v. FEC declared, in sweeping terms, 
that “the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political 
speech based on the speaker’s identity,” as such restrictions are “all too 
often simply a means to control content.”
149
 The Court applied what Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 511. 
 144. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 145. Id. at 867. 
 146. See infra notes 264–71 and accompanying text. 
 147. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868, 872. 
 148. As one prominent commentator put it, free speech claims have, “in the hands of the 
current court, become an engine of deregulation.” Linda Greenhouse, An Indecent Burial, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-
burial.html; see also Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First 
Amendment, 25 BROOKLYN J.L. & POL’Y. 63, 64 (2016) (contending that the Roberts Court is 
“the most speech-protective Supreme Court in memory”).  
 149. 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
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Stevens denominated a “glittering generality”
150
 to invalidate federal bans 
on corporate expenditures that support express advocacy or electioneering 
communications related to a political candidate, holding that “the 




If the identity of the speaker cannot serve as a basis for suppressing 
political speech, then foreign speakers would seem to benefit as much from 
Citizens United’s categorical rule as corporate speakers. Indeed, the central 
rationale supporting the rule reinforces this conclusion. In rejecting the 
antidistortion rationale of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce—
which previously upheld corporate speech restrictions on the ground that 
the aggregate wealth and other advantages of the corporate form give 
corporations an outsized advantage in the marketplace of ideas unrelated to 
the value of their speech
152
—the Court reasoned that Austin itself 
“interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First 
Amendment” by “prevent[ing] voices and viewpoints from reaching the 
public and advising voters.”
153
 Consequently, the majority concluded, when 
the government restricts “where a person may get his or her information or 
what distrusted source he or she may not hear,” it violates “the freedom to 
think for ourselves” that the First Amendment protects.
154
  
Because the corporate bans at issue were not targeted at foreign 
corporations, the majority in Citizens United reserved the question whether 
its sweeping prohibition on speaker-based restrictions of political speech 
would extend to federal bans on contributions by foreign individuals or 
associations.
155
 But in dissent, Justice Stevens argued that, “[i]f taken 
seriously,” the majority’s categorical rule and sweeping rationale would 
reach foreign speakers (including propagandists like Tokyo Rose during 
World War II) as well as foreign-controlled corporations.
156
 He criticized 
this outcome, observing that “[t]he notion that Congress might lack the 
authority to distinguish foreigners from citizens” in regulating 
electioneering communications within the country “would certainly have 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 365 (majority opinion). 
 152. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 153. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. Of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)). 
 154. Id. at 355. 
 155. See id. at 362 (“We need not reach the question whether the Government has a 
compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our 
Nation’s political process.”). 
 156. Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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surprised the Framers, whose obsession with foreign influence derived from 
a fear that foreign powers and individuals had no basic investment in the 
well-being of the country.”
157
  
On the merits, there is much force to Justice Stevens’s dissent, including 
his historical point about the Framers’ fear of foreign meddling in a 
fledgling democracy.
158
 But the force of that historical argument does not 
undermine his conclusion that the logical endpoint of the majority’s 
decision is the preclusion of government regulation of campaign speech 
based on the foreign identity of the speaker. Regulations barring foreign 
speakers from sharing their “voices and viewpoints” with the public on 
electoral matters would interfere with “the open marketplace of ideas” in 
similar fashion to the corporate bans invalidated in Citizens United. Both 
kinds of restrictions deny the public “information” from “distrusted 
source[s]” by government fiat rather than listener choice, thereby limiting 
the public’s “freedom to think for ourselves.”
159
 Furthermore, just as 
corporations might “possess valuable expertise” in their areas, “leaving 
them best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, 
including the speech of candidates and elected officials,”
160
 so too might 
foreign speakers possess specialized information and perspectives that 
would help the public assess the foreign policy positions of candidates, 
elected officials, and the country.  
Of course, there is much in the majority’s simplistic and sanguine use of 
the marketplace of ideas metaphor that is subject to criticism, which Justice 
Stevens aptly leveled in his dissent.
161
 But the pertinent point here is that, 
however unpersuasive, the majority relied on that marketplace metaphor to 
support its categorical rule against speaker-based distinctions. As in prior 
opinions recognizing and rationalizing the right to receive information and 
ideas, Citizens United favored unrestricted access to information and 
ideas—even from potentially dangerous or distrustful speakers—as 
essential to “the rights of free thought”
162
 and “the freedom to think for 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. at 424 n.51 (quoting Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 393 n. 245 (2009)). 
 158. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or 
a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
eligible to the Office of President.”). 
 159. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356. 
 160. Id. at 364. 
 161. See id. at 465–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 253–254 and 
accompanying text. 
 162. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560 n.3 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 that Stanley and Citizens United respectively characterized as 
the ultimate right protected by the First Amendment.  
Citizens United thus offers more than just reaffirmation of the right to 
receive information and ideas. It adds substantive content to that right in the 
form of a general prohibition on regulating political speech based on the 
speaker’s identity.
164
 This constitutional command of speaker neutrality 
bolsters earlier decisions such as Meyer and Lamont that denied the 
government’s regulatory power to exclude information and ideas of foreign 
origin because of the domestic audience’s overriding First Amendment 
right to receive them.  
Given the categorical language and broad reasoning of Citizens United, it 
is perhaps susceptible to over-reading as further precedent for a right to 
receive speech from abroad, including from foreign individuals, 
associations, and states. But this reading is further supported by Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence, in which he argued that, because the First 
Amendment is “written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers,” it textually 
“offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker.”
165
 Election law 
scholar Richard Hasen has also concluded that “it is difficult to see how any 
of the arguments supporting a foreign spending limit could be squared with 
the reasoning of the majority in Citizens United.”
166
  
Yet a follow-up case does offer some cause for caution against over-
reading Citizens United. In Bluman v. FEC, two resident aliens challenged 
the federal bans on campaign and political contributions by foreigners.
167
 
They argued that those bans ran afoul of “the Court’s condemnation of 
speaker-based restrictions on political speech” in Citizens United.
168
 A 
three-judge district court ruled against them, relying on a line of pre-
Citizens United cases upholding the exclusion of foreigners from “activities 
‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-government,’” such as 
voting, holding elective office, teaching in public schools, and serving as 
police officers.
169
 As for Citizens United, the district court observed that the 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356. 
 164. Of course, the categorical solidity of that prohibition is subject to question, as 
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent. See id. at 420–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 166. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
581, 606 (2011). 
 167. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 168. Jurisdictional Statement at *7, Bluman v. FEC, No. 11-275 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2011), 
2752011 WL 3919650. 
 169. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 
(1984)). 
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majority had left the question open and opted to follow Justice Stevens’s 
dissent as an “accurate indicator of where the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence stands on the question of foreign contributions and 
expenditures.”
170
 Furthermore, the panel limited its ruling to the monetary 
bans at issue, disclaiming any decision on “whether Congress could 




On appeal, the Court unanimously upheld the district court ruling, 
without any attempt at explanation, in a summary affirmance.
172
 Perhaps it 
could not cobble together an explanation upon which the remaining Citizens 
United dissenters
173
 and majority could agree. More pointedly, as Professor 
Hasen has argued, the Court could only reconcile the reasoning of Citizens 
United with the result in Bluman “through doctrinal incoherence.”
174
  
Thus, in theory, Bluman’s summary affirmance may imply a limit to 
Citizen United’s anti-discrimination rule for speakers. But as the district 
court in Bluman was careful to observe, it at least remains an open question 
after Citizens United whether the government may exclude from the 
domestic marketplace of ideas the political speech of foreigners, as opposed 
to their campaign contributions and expenditures. And given the Court’s 
increasingly strong embrace of the open marketplace of ideas, culminating 




Sorrell and Zemel. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court invalidated a 
state law that prohibited pharmacies from selling or disclosing and banned 
pharmaceutical companies from using physician-identifiable prescribing 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. at 289. 
 171. Id. at 292. 
 172. See Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
 173. Justice Stevens, in the interim between Citizens United and Bluman, had retired. His 
dissent in Citizens United, from which he read during the Court’s hand down of the decision, 
was his last and longest dissent. 
 174. Hasen, supra note 166, at 610. 
 175. In his symposium essay, Professor Joshua Sellers makes the narrower claim that 
lying by foreign nationals in expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate 
remains proscribable even after Alvarez. See Joshua Sellers, Legislating Against Lying in 
Campaigns and Elections, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 141, 157 (2018) (“[I]f foreign nationals are 
prohibited from making contributions and expenditures—rights that, especially in the case of 
expenditures, have enjoyed substantial constitutional protection—it naturally follows that 
their right to engage in intentionally false speech expressly advocating for or against the 
election of a candidate may be similarly regulated.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10
2018]       THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN SPEECH 299 
 
 
records for marketing purposes.
176
 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
observed that, because “facts” are “the beginning point” for much speech, 
“[t]here is . . . a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is 
speech for First Amendment purposes.”
177
 In any case, because the law 
“imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on protected expression” 




Sorrell bolstered the right to receive information and ideas in two ways. 
Most obviously, it reaffirmed Citizens United’s general rule against 
speaker-based restrictions as a backdoor for content-based censorship of 
disfavored ideas.
179
 More importantly, though, it added another potential 
dimension to the right to receive information and ideas, suggesting an 
extension to “the beginning point” of the formation of speech—that is, the 
acquisition of information on which speech is based.
180
  
This contrasts somewhat with the Court’s apparent rejection of a claim of 
information-gathering as speech half a century earlier in Zemel v. Rusk.
181
 
In Zemel, the Court dismissed the contention that the State Department’s 
refusal to validate a passport for travel to Cuba—to make the traveler “a 
better informed citizen”—implicated the First Amendment, as the travel 
embargo was “an inhibition of action” rather than speech.
182
 But restrictions 
on conduct can incidentally burden speech and give rise to First 
Amendment claims,
183
 so the conclusion that the travel embargo regulated 
conduct did not preclude the traveler from raising a valid free speech claim. 
Perhaps recognizing this, the Court alternatively declared that “[t]he right to 




Significantly, while this statement in Zemel may appear to reject the 
claim that information-gathering is a First Amendment protected activity, it 
actually acknowledges the possibility of such a claim in denying that the 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
 177. Id. at 570. 
 178. Id. at 571. The Court did not find it necessary to determine whether strict scrutiny 
was appropriate, as is generally the case for content- and speaker-based restrictions, or 
whether the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech was appropriate, because it 
determined that the state law would fail both. See id. 
 179. See id. at 580. 
 180. See id. at 570. 
 181. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 182. Id. at 4, 16. 
 183. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 184. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17. 
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 Sorrell all but confirms that acknowledgement in 
recognizing the “strong argument” that information gathering of prescriber 
practices “is speech for First Amendment purposes.”
186
 And a direct 
endorsement of information gathering as a protected First Amendment 
activity would strengthen the claim that gathering facts and opinions from 
other speakers, including foreign nationals and nations, is protected by the 
First Amendment as well.  
Entertainment Merchants and Stevens. Another potentially significant 
precedent from the Roberts Court’s speech-protective portfolio is Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, which struck down a state ban on the sale 
of violent video games to minors.
187
 Most notably—and vividly, given 
Justice Scalia’s authorship—the Court endorsed the principle that all 
protected speech, regardless of its cultural and intellectual worth, is subject 
to the same First Amendment standards, including strict scrutiny for 
content-based restrictions:  
Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and 
intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat. But these 
cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones. 
Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap 
novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The 
Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon them must survive strict 
scrutiny . . . .
188
 
That First Amendment protection generally does not depend on the 
social value of the speech is, of course, a point made in many previous 
cases, including Stanley.
189
 But the Roberts Court’s forceful reaffirmation 
of that point is nonetheless significant—especially when applied to speech, 
like extremely violent video games, that puts the point to the test.  
Another recent test case was United States v. Stevens, which invalidated 
a federal ban targeting fetishistic depictions of animal cruelty known as 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Which, of course, no constitutional right, including any First Amendment right, is. 
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. For further examination of the nature and limits 
of information-gathering as a First Amendment right, particularly in light of Zemel, see 
Blitz, supra note 44, at 89–91, 102–03. 
 186. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011). 
 187. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 188. Id. at 796 n.4. The majority’s recognition that minors have a right of access to 
speech that concededly may be of very little social worth extends the “significant” First 
Amendment protection that children possess, as recognized by the Court in Bolger. See 
supra note 132. 
 189. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
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 Rejecting as “startling and dangerous” the proposition 
that “an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” might serve 
as “a general precondition” for protecting speech that does not fall into a 
historically unprotected category, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion 
noted that “[m]ost of what we say to one another . . . lacks value . . . but it is 
still sheltered from Government regulation.”
191
  
Of course, statements like these are scattered throughout the U.S. 
Reports.
192
 But these reaffirmations are particularly significant for a number 
of reasons. First, the simple fact of the Roberts Court reaffirming these 
statements confirms their continuing vitality. Second, the strength of their 
reaffirmation puts them on the same categorical plane as Citizens United’s 
rule against speaker-based restrictions.  
Indeed, Citizens United, Entertainment Merchants, and Stevens together 
present a formidable pair of rules that fortify the right to receive 
information and ideas on two fronts—one barring the denial of marketplace 
access based on the identity of the speaker, the other barring the denial of 
marketplace access based on the value of the speech. Neither these 
categorical rules nor their marketplace rationales easily yield to an 
exception. If the protection of violent video games and crush videos are as 
essential for people “to think for ourselves” as corporate electioneering 
communications,
193
 then it is difficult to see why information and ideas 
from abroad, whether from foreign individuals or even hostile foreign 
nations, are not either. Finally, on top of Playboy, Reno, and Ashcroft, the 
unhesitating and unstinting application of First Amendment principles to 
relatively new expressive media such as video games leaves no doubt that 
the right to receive information and ideas extends to wherever speakers and 




                                                                                                                 
 190. 559 U.S. 460, 465–66, 482 (2010). 
 191. Id. at 470, 479. 
 192. For example, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479–80 (“Even ‘[w]holly 
neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or 
Donne’s sermons.” (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
And Justice Scalia reached back over half a century to (re)make the point that even if certain 
expressive materials have “‘nothing of any possible value to society . . . , they are as much 
entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.’” Entertainment Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 796–97 n.4 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
 193. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010). 
 194. See infra Section III.D. 
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Alvarez. Whether the government may regulate fake news and other 
falsehoods from abroad will partly turn on United States v. Alvarez.
195
 In 
that case, an elected member of a local water district board falsely boasted 
that he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor for acts of valor as 
a marine.
196
 That lie was a crime under the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law 
that banned lying about receiving congressional military honors.
197
 
A diverse plurality of the Court, led by Justice Kennedy and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, invalidated the 
law on First Amendment grounds.
198
 In a familiar pattern for the Roberts 
Court, the plurality dismissed any possibility that lying about military 
honors should be considered unprotected speech pursuant to a balancing of 
the social costs and benefits of the speech.
199
 As in Stevens and 
Entertainment Merchants, the plurality firmly limited that balancing 




In addition, the plurality rejected the government’s broader argument 
that the Court has traditionally treated false speech as lacking in value and 
First Amendment protection.
201
 While acknowledging that certain kinds of 
false statements, such as defamation, fraud, and perjury, fall outside of the 
First Amendment, the plurality confined unprotected falsehoods to 
statements that cause some “legally cognizable harm” apart from the 
potential of all falsehoods to interfere with “the truth-seeking function of 
the marketplace of ideas.”
202
 For example, defamation damages reputation, 




The plurality declined to endorse the government’s proposed 
“categorical rule” that “false statements receive no First Amendment 
protection.”
204
 If “the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to 
sustain a ban on speech,” the plurality warned, then the government “could 
compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable” with 
                                                                                                                 
 195. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 196. Id. at 713. 
 197. Id. at 714. 
 198. Id. at 715. 
 199. See id. at 717. 
 200. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 201. See id. at 718. 
 202. Id. at 718–19 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)). 
 203. See id. at 719–21. 
 204. Id. at 719. 
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“no clear limiting principle.”
205
 Instead of “Oceania’s Ministry of Truth,” 
the plurality endorsed the familiar First Amendment refrain that “[t]he 
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”
206
 For military honors, 
the remedy could take the form of online databases to verify claims and 
expose false ones.
207
 Quoting Justice Holmes, the plurality concluded that 
this “competition of the market” would be “the best test of truth,” consistent 
with “[t]he theory of our Constitution.”
208
  
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment with Justice Kagan, distanced 
himself from the “strict categorical analysis” of the plurality.
209
 Instead, he 
favored an ad-hoc “proportionality review” that neither results in “near-
automatic condemnation” nor “near-automatic approval,” and that he 
equated with “what the Court has termed ‘intermediate scrutiny.’”
210
 As he 
further explained, this approach asks “whether the statute works speech-
related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications,” as well as 




Applying his approach, Justice Breyer accepted that the statute had a 
“substantial justification” in protecting military honors from dilution, but 
concluded that “a more finely tailored statute” that “insist[s] upon a 
showing that the false statement caused specific harm” or “focus[es] its 
coverage on lies most likely to be harmful,” would be more proportionate 
and consistent with narrower common law and statutory instances in which 
falsehoods have been outlawed.
212
 He distinguished the law at issue from 
“[l]aws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the 
social sciences, the arts, and the like,” which have triggered strict scrutiny 
because of “[t]he dangers of suppressing valuable ideas.”
213
 And, of 
particular relevance here, Justice Breyer cautioned:  
In the political arena a false statement is more likely to make a 
behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Id. at 723. 
 206. Id. at 723, 727. 
 207. Id. at 729. 
 208. Id. at 728 (plurality) (“The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the marketplace.’” 
(quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 209. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 210. Id. at 730–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211. Id. at 730. 
 212. Id. at 734, 737–38. 
 213. Id. at 731–32. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
304 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:269 
 
 
speaker), but at the same time criminal prosecution is 
particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential 
election result) and consequently can more easily result in 
censorship of speakers and their ideas. Thus, the statute may 
have to be significantly narrowed in its applications.
214
  
Justice Breyer’s concurrence thus left open the possibility of 
“significantly” narrow regulations of false political speech, including fake 
news and other misleading speech from abroad, to prevent the public in 
general and voters in particular from being misled. At the same time, his 
concurrence made clear that the needle would—and should—be especially 
difficult to thread given the risk of censorship. This possibility and its 
qualifications are especially significant given that his and Justice Kagan’s 
less categorical views tipped the outcome of the case.  
Justice Alito’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, also bears 
on the constitutionality of any proposal to regulate false or misleading 
speech. The dissenters’ take on the constitutional status of falsehoods was 
the categorical inverse of the plurality’s—“false factual statements possess 
no intrinsic First Amendment value” and “merit no First Amendment 
protection in their own right.”
215
 Rather, some false statements warrant “a 
measure of strategic protection” where necessary “to prevent the chilling of 




However, in apparent agreement with both the plurality and the 
concurrence—making for a unanimous Court—the dissenters qualified that 
“there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize 
purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of 
suppressing truthful speech.”
217
 Those areas include “philosophy, religion, 
history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern,” 
where the state might very well proscribe falsehoods “for political ends.”
218
 
Given this caveat—and, importantly, given its consistency with the 
categorical views of the plurality and more qualified views of the 
concurrence—it appears that a wide majority, if not the entirety, of the 
Roberts Court would strike down regulations on false political speech given 
the intolerable risk of government bias and meddling in this quintessential 
                                                                                                                 
 214. Id. at 738. 
 215. Id. at 746, 748–49. 
 216. Id. at 750, 751 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)). 
 217. Id. at 751. 
 218. Id. at 751, 752. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10
2018]       THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN SPEECH 305 
 
 
sector of the marketplace of ideas.
219
 Consequently, as Professor Joshua 
Sellers observes in his contribution to this symposium issue, Alvarez also 




In sum, the Court in recent decades has fortified the right to receive 
information and ideas in a variety of contexts, adding breadth and vitality to 
that right. Perhaps most consequentially, the Court in Citizens United v. 
FEC generally forbade regulating speech on the basis of the identity of the 
speaker, and its categorical rule and far-reaching rationale inescapably 
extend to all manner of foreign speakers. Additionally, in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., the Court broadly recognized that information gathering is 
entitled to First Amendment protection as a predicate to speech. Together, 
these cases fortify the right of domestic listeners to gather information and 
ideas from speakers regardless of their nationality or locality. Furthermore, 
Entertainment Merchants and Stevens augment Citizens United’s 
categorical ban on speaker-based discrimination with their bar against 
restrictions based on the asserted lack of social value of certain expressive 
materials that fall outside the historically unprotected categories of speech. 
These cases could hinder the government from justifying on social value 
grounds any attempt to block false or misleading foreign speech from 
entering the domestic marketplace. Finally, in Alvarez, an otherwise-
splintered Roberts Court united to express skepticism about the ability of 
the government to regulate false political speech, with a wide majority 
appearing to rule it out. Considered together, these decisions likely preclude 
the government from barring the entry of political speech from abroad on 
the ground that the speaker is foreign or that the speech is valueless or 
false—not because foreign speakers abroad have a First Amendment right 
to speak, but because the First Amendment demands an open marketplace 
of ideas for domestic listeners. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 219. For further discussion of the impact of Alvarez on the First Amendment status of 
falsehoods, see Sellers, supra note 175, at 146-49; Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech and 
the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2018); Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage, 
and Other Human Dispositions: Reflections on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71 
OKLA. L. REV. 35, 39-47 (2018). 
 220. Sellers, supra note 175, at 149 n.52 (citing Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right 
to Lie in Campaigns and Elections, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 56 (2013) (“The result of Alvarez 
is that laws regulating false campaign speech are in even more constitutional trouble than 
they were before, and any attempts to regulate such speech will have to be narrow, targeted, 
and careful in their choice of remedies.”)). 
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D. Receiving Foreign Information and Ideas Online 
The rise of online media platforms, particularly social networks, as the 
primary channels for the dissemination of speech worldwide has 
mitigated—if not rendered obsolete—the traditional sovereign authority 
upheld by the Court in previous decades to deny physical entry to certain 
expressive materials and speakers from abroad. And, building on the 
Court’s earlier online speech opinions in Reno v. ACLU and Ashcroft v. 
ACLU,
221
 a majority of the Roberts Court at least appears ready to protect 
access to information and ideas online, including from abroad, to the same, 
robust extent as speech in traditional public forums.  
While the federal government has stepped up searches of electronic 
devices belonging to travelers entering at the border
222
 and expanded its 
screening of visa applicants to include their social media activities,
223
 it has 
not yet attempted to screen and block online speech from abroad. Whether 
this regulatory inaction arises from the technical and pragmatic difficulties 
inherent in filtering online content from abroad,
224
 or whether legal or 
political considerations have kept the United States from joining other 
regimes that attempt to control the cross-border flow of information,
225
 the 
federal government at present focuses its enforcement efforts on domestic 
recipients and distributors of proscribed speech.
226
 Consequently, as 
Professor Timothy Zick has concluded, “the digitization of speech has 
fundamentally altered the scope of the First Amendment by reducing 
governmental power to bar information and ideas at the nation’s territorial 
borders.”
227
 On the worldwide web, in other words, the marketplace of 
ideas has become “unalterably de-territorialized.”
228
  
                                                                                                                 
 221. See supra notes 138–141 and accompanying text. 
 222. See Ron Nixon, Cellphone and Computer Searches at U.S. Border Rise Under 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trump-
border-search-cellphone-computer.html. 
 223. See Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration Approves Tougher Visa Vetting, 
Including Social Media Checks, REUTERS (May 31, 2017, 6:58 PM), https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-usa-immigration-visa/trump-administration-approves-tougher-visa-vetting-
including-social-media-checks-idUSKBN18R3F8. 
 224. See Zick, supra note 30, at 1603 (“It is one thing to prevent the entry of harmful 
persons, packages, and other tangible materials into the United States. It is quite another to 
stop bits and bytes at territorial borders.”).  
 225. See Key Internet Controls By Country, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/key-internet-controls-table-2017 (last visited May 31, 2018). 
 226. See Zick, supra note 30, at 1605. 
 227. Id. at 1606. 
 228. Id. 
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The truth of this claim is apparent to anyone in the United States with an 
internet connection. Content from abroad is a simple click, tap, or swipe 
away; moreover, such content is often commingled with domestic content 
without distinction. It has never been so easy to receive so much 
information and so many ideas from so many sources, both foreign and 
domestic.  
But on the flip side, as various investigations are uncovering, it has also 
never been so easy for foreign speakers—including hostile foreign 
powers—to exploit this open marketplace of ideas maliciously to 
disseminate misinformation.
229
 In particular, the 2016 presidential election 
cycle vividly illustrates how popular social networks such as Facebook and 
Twitter, with the voluntary clustering of politically likeminded individuals 
and the application of sophisticated ad targeting, can greatly amplify the 
reach—if not also the effectiveness—of a sensational story from a foreign 
speaker seeking to influence the domestic political marketplace.  
There is no doubt that a majority of the current Court views this open 
online marketplace as a vital forum for speech, and that the ease of access 
to information and ideas from abroad is generally regarded as a virtue rather 
than a vice. Just this past term, in Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court 
through Justice Kennedy extolled “the ‘vast democratic forums of the 
Internet.’”
230
 Moreover, the Court singled out social media for its 
“relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communications of all 
kinds,”
231
 and Facebook in particular for facilitating speech among a 
worldwide user base “three times the population of North America.”
232
 
Because of the “vast potential” for the online marketplace of ideas to “alter 
how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be,” the Court 
cautioned against any suggestion that the First Amendment should not 
vigorously protect “access to vast networks in that medium.”
233
  
Accordingly, the Court struck down a state statute that barred registered 
sex offenders from accessing social networks and other websites where they 
may contact minors.
234
 Assessed against the state’s interest in protecting 
minors online from sex offenders, the Court found the statute fell far short 
of narrow tailoring even under the assumption that it was content neutral 
and subject to the less demanding means-ends fit of intermediate 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 230. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)). 
 231. Id. (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 1736. 
 234. See id. at 1734–35. 
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 The state could not “bar[] access to what for many are the 
principle sources for knowing current events . . . speaking and listening in 
the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of 
human thought and knowledge.”
236
 This and similar language in Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion
237
 not only come off as paeans to the internet 
as a modern speech forum “of historic proportions,”
238
 but also as 
expressions of the importance of protecting the right to receive information 
and ideas in its “vast realms.”
239
  
It was precisely this “loose rhetoric” comparing the internet to traditional 
public forums that “troubled” Justice Alito, who along with the Chief 
Justice and Justice Thomas only concurred in the judgment.
240
 Though 
agreeing with the majority that the law was not narrowly tailored,
241
 Justice 
Alito’s opinion criticized the Court for failing to “be cautious in applying 
our free speech precedents to the internet” given “important differences 
between cyberspace and the physical world.”
242
 According to Justice Alito, 
differences relevant to the statutory context at issue included “[the] 
unprecedented degree of anonymity” online that “easily permits” speakers 
to “assume a false identity.”
243
  
In sum, unfiltered domestic access to the internet has made foreign 
information and ideas available in “historic proportions.”
244
 Any attempt at 
limiting such access would run up against the Packingham majority’s 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Id. at 1736. 
 236. Id. at 1737. 
 237. See, e.g., id. at 1738 (concluding that the state “may not enact this complete bar to 
the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern 
society and culture”). 
 238. Id. at 1736. 
 239. Id. at 1737. These sentiments in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion echo those of 
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Reno, at the advent of widespread public internet 
usage, that “[t]he Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human 
communication” in which “tens of millions” can communicate and access “vast amounts of 
information from around the world.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). 
 240. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Justice Gorsuch did not join the Court in time to 
participate in the decision. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The fatal problem for [the law] is that its wide 
sweep precludes access to a large number of websites that are most unlikely to facilitate the 
commission of a sex crime against a child.”). 
 242. Id. at 1743. 
 243. Id. at 1743–44. 
 244. Id. at 1736. 
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strongly worded warnings against restricting the internet’s “vast democratic 
forums” for “speaking and listening.”
245
  
IV. Foreign Speech and First Amendment Functions 
Given the exploitation of our online marketplace of ideas by foreign 
individuals affiliated with the Russian government to sway the 2016 
election and sow social discord with sensational and false speech, it is 
essential to consider whether this current state of affairs is consistent not 
only with case law, but moreover with the primary functions of the First 
Amendment. Three functions are commonly cited as underlying the First 
Amendment: facilitating the search for truth, promoting democratic self-
governance, and furthering self-realization.
246
  
Truth-seeking. It seems safe to conclude that unfettered access to foreign 
speech that is truthful facilitates the oft-cited marketplace function of 
sorting truth from falsehood.
247
 Listeners exposed to truthful speech gain 
the opportunity to weigh it against false speech and decide for themselves 
which to accept. For example, data, studies, and other speech from abroad 
on the existence of and threats posed by climate change, including from 
foreign scientists and organizations,
248
 offer counterpoints to the domestic 
suppression or denial of such empirical facts and scientific consensus.
249
 At 
best, the truths from abroad are adopted. At worse, they are not, but at least 
remain available for reconsideration. The search for truth is thereby either 
advanced or at least not made any worse off.  
On matters where truth is not settled or on matters of opinion, it also is 
advantageous, if not imperative, to truth-seeking to protect access to 
information and ideas from every interested speaker, including both friends 
and foes. For instance, suppose the President makes a case for war against a 
foreign nation based on an unproven assertion that it is illegally harboring 
weapons of mass destruction.
250
 Before American lives and resources are 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. at 1735, 1737 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 621 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)). 
 246. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5–9 (6th 
ed. 2016); Marceau & Chen, supra note 44, at 999; Zick, supra note 30, at 1593. 
 247. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 248. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT (2013–2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/. 
 249. See, e.g., Sarah Sax, See How Trump Is Hiding Climate Change, VICE NEWS (Jan. 
11, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/gywmx3/before-and-after-images-show-how-
trump-is-hiding-climate-change. 
 250. Cf. Text: Bush’s Speech on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2003), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2003/03/18/politics/text-bushs-speech-on-iraq.html. 
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committed, it would seem crucial for the public to hear what other world 
leaders—not least the one against whose nation war is threatened—might 
have to say with respect to the truth of those accusations or the desirability 
of the threatened conflict. Even if “the competition of the marketplace” 
does not operate swiftly enough for the public to accurately assess the 
asserted basis for going to war or the wisdom of it,
251
 at least such 
competition would allow the public to make a more informed judgment. 
Thus, unfiltered access to counter-speech from abroad seems essential, 
particularly in the foreign policy context, where the full array of facts and 
perspectives on international disputes may not otherwise be advanced by 
domestic leaders.  
When an adversary as resourceful and sophisticated as Russia broadly 
disseminates speech weaponized to deceive,
252
 the truth-facilitating function 
of access to foreign information and ideas might be difficult to perceive. 
One might theoretically propound that marketplace competition is “the best 
test of truth”
253
 and that, when “[Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the [worse], in a free and open encounter?”
254
 But as the 
nation’s experience with Russia’s extensive disinformation campaign 
during the 2016 election has illustrated, falsehoods may not be exposed and 
truths may not emerge until well after voters leave the ballot booth.
255
 As 
one scholar has observed, “In the long run, true ideas do tend to drive out 
false ones,” but “the short run may be very long.”
256
  
Moreover, “[t]he remedy for speech that is false”
257
 may not reach the 
highly polarized echo chambers of social media and news coverage 
consumed by millions of Americans.
258
 Indeed, a recent study by the 
European Research Council concluded “that fact-checking largely failed to 
effectively reach consumers of fake news” on Facebook, which the study 
                                                                                                                 
 251. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 7–25 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 254. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (Percy Lund, Humphries & Co. Ltd. 1927) (1644). 
But see Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1641, 1641 (1967) (arguing that “a self-operating marketplace of ideas . . . has long 
ceased to exist” because of concentrated ownership and control of “the media of mass 
communications”). 
 255. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
 256. Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979). 
 257. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012). 
 258. See Roheeni Saxena, The Social Media “Echo Chamber” Is Real, ARS TECHNICA 
(Mar. 13, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/03/the-social-media-echo-
chamber-is-real/. 
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also found to be “the most important mechanism facilitating [its] spread.”
259
 
That study also found, however, that the most avid fake news consumers 
generally were the highest consumers of traditional news,
260
 and another 
study found that most Americans do not turn to social media as their “most 
important” source of news.
261
  
Because of the unprecedented nature of the spread of fake news during 
the 2016 election, further study is needed on how it affects consumers and 
the marketplace at large.
262
 While “the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth” may in theory be “produced by its collision with 
error,”
263
 it is impossible to say at present whether, as an empirical matter, 
unrestricted access to false and misleading foreign speech ultimately tends 
to further, frustrate, or not affect the truth-seeking function of the First 
Amendment.  
Self-governance. Closely related to the truth-seeking function of the First 
Amendment is its promotion of democratic discussion and decision-
making. As Justice Harlan articulated in Cohen v. California, the First 
Amendment  
is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from 
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what 
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the 
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more 
capable citizenry and more perfect polity.
264
  
For the public to be better informed, debate on public issues needs to be 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” which in turn is facilitated by access 
to information and ideas beyond those curated by government officials.
265
  
                                                                                                                 
 259. Guess et al., supra note 9, at 2. 
 260. See id. at S24. 
 261. Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 262. See Guess et al., supra note 9, at 11–12; Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 232. 
 263. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 25 (Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1859). 
 264. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) 
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 265. Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Letter from James 
Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard 
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Indeed, on foreign policy matters and other global issues, it seems 
indisputable generally that input from abroad benefits public understanding, 
discussion, and decision-making by supplying the public with a wider set of 
facts and views to consider, including those that domestic leaders may not 
wish to publicize. In addition to the example of climate change, consider 
the increasingly threatening exchanges between President Trump and Kim 
Jong Un last fall.
266
 Without knowledge of how North Korea’s leader 
responded, not to mention the reactions of other world leaders, it would 
have been difficult if not impossible for the public to assess the President’s 
words and policies toward the hostile nuclear state. So in our interconnected 
times, open access to information and ideas from abroad seems essential for 
self-governance at home, including in the context of electoral campaigns, 
where foreign policy can take center stage.
267
  
As with truth-seeking, whether unrestricted access to fake news and 
other falsehoods from abroad improves public discussion and decision-
making is a more difficult question. Again, the answer is affirmative if the 
marketplace functions efficiently and effectively in sorting truths from 
falsehoods.
268
 But that is a big “if” requiring further empirical study with 
respect to the marketplace effects of a massive misinformation campaign 
such as Russia’s in 2016.
269
 It may turn out that such sizable and 
sophisticated operations by foreign states do cloud public debate and 
adversely affect democratic decision making, and, furthermore, that 
suppressing such disinformation operations by state actors would not chill 
other valuable speech from home or abroad.
270
 If so, then perhaps some 
                                                                                                                 
Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”). 
 266. See Peter Baker & Rick Gladstone, With Combative Style and Epithets, Trump 
Takes America First to the U.N., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/09/19/world/trump-un-north-korea-iran.html (reporting on President Trump’s U.N. 
address, in which he vowed to “totally destroy North Korea” if it threatens the United 
States); Full Text of Kim Jong-un’s Response to President Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/world/asia/kim-jong-un-trump.html (respond-
ing that North Korea “will consider with seriousness exercising of a corresponding, highest 
level of hard-line countermeasure in history”). 
 267. See Joshua Berlinger, Nukes, Terrorists and Hackers: Trump and Clinton Debate 
Global Threats, CNN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/27/politics/presi 
dential-debate-global-topics/index.html. 
 268. See supra notes 253–63 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 22-23, 262 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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speaker-based disclosures at the nation-state level may be justified in 
principle to protect democratic self-governance, as proposed in Part V.
271
  
Self-realization. The First Amendment is also recognized as furthering 
self-development and fulfillment—the freedom of speech “make[s] men 
free to develop their faculties,”
272
 enables each individual to “realize[] his 
or her full potential,”
273
 and protects against “[the] denial of autonomy . . . 
over [an individual’s] own reasoning.”
274
 Allowing unfiltered access to 
foreign information and ideas, including calculated and coordinated 




If individuals prefer news and other speech from abroad that align with 
their political or social leanings—and studies suggests that is generally 
so
276
—then government restrictions should not stand in the way of 
“what . . . [they] may read or what . . . [they] may watch” as matters of 
personal choice.
277
 Even if personal development may be shaped by 
individuals’ choices of what to consume from abroad, the First Amendment 
affords them those choices, for good or ill.
278
 To be sure, the freedom to 
further one’s development through the consumption of the speech of one’s 
choosing should end where it denies the autonomy of another.
279
 But mere 
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concern that access to foreign falsehoods may “poison the mind”
280
 does 
not suffice to overcome the autonomy principle that some Justices and 
scholars find in the First Amendment.  
In sum, open access to foreign information and ideas seems generally 
consistent with the commonly identified functions of the First Amendment 
to further truth-seeking, democratic self-governance, and self-realization. 
The difficult case of a large-scale, sophisticated misinformation campaign 
by a hostile foreign power requires further empirical study to determine 
whether, to what extent, and in what ways the truth-seeking and 
democracy-promoting functions of the First Amendment may be 
undermined. 
V. Policy Responses and Recommendations 
In response to the continuing threat that fake news and foreign meddling 
in the marketplace of ideas may undercut democratic governance and 
influence elections, a number of industry and government responses have 
been advanced.  
Evolving Responses. Out of political pressure
281
 if not also out of a sense 
of social responsibility,
282
 Facebook, Twitter, Google, and other major 
online platforms have begun making various changes to their platforms to 
combat fake news.
283
 As the platform responsible for the most 
dissemination of fake news,
284
 Facebook’s evolving playbook illustrates the 
technological and policy challenges in effectively identifying and 
remedying that kind of misinformation.  
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com/2017/10/31/us/politics/facebook-twitter-google-hearings-congress.html. 
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Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google 
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In December 2016, Facebook partnered with independent fact-checking 
organizations to flag fake news articles for users.
285
 After a year of trial, 
however, Facebook found that the flags did not clearly or sufficiently 
convey the reasons for disputing the article, that they could sometimes 
backfire and further entrench a user’s beliefs, and that the process took too 
long given the massive amount of potentially fake news on its platform.
286
 
Instead, Facebook began surfacing fact-checked related articles next to 
disputed ones, and found that although the “click-through rates” for the fake 
news articles did not meaningfully decline, the rate of sharing such articles 
did.
287
 Along with other major online platforms, Facebook has also purged 
fake accounts and added “trust indicators” to news articles, where users can 
find information uploaded by publishers about their publication, ownership 
structure, and fact-checking, corrections, and ethics policies.
288
 Most 
recently, Facebook has announced that it will crowdsource the trust 
rankings of news sources to its immense userbase, characterizing this 
approach as the “most objective” while confessing that it was not 
“comfortable” taking on the role itself.
289
 Critics swiftly condemned this 
new approach, however, as “the path of least responsibility for 
Facebook”
290
 and one that could further entrench the political echo 
chambers on its platform.
291
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Policymakers also have advanced proposals for fighting fake news. For 
example, at the state level, California legislators have proposed two starkly 
different approaches. The first proposal would have broadly banned any 
“false or deceptive statement designed to influence the vote” on “[a]ny 
issue” or “[a]ny candidate,” but this proposal was withdrawn after 
withering criticism over its breadth.
292
 The second proposal mirrors 
measures in other states calling for the creation of a K-12 curriculum in 
“media literacy” that would teach students to consume media critically and 
to differentiate between real and fake news.
293
 On the federal level, one bill, 
co-sponsored by Senators Amy Klobuchar, John McCain, and Mark 
Warner, would require disclosure of the purchaser of online political ads.
294
 
Another bill recently introduced by Senators Chris Van Hollen and Marco 
Rubio would require the Director of National Intelligence to report on 
foreign interference after each federal election and would call for sanctions 
on foreign states caught meddling through misinformation campaigns or 
hacking.
295
 In addition, the Federal Election Commission has proposed 
extending the purchaser disclosure requirement for certain political and 
campaign ads
296
 to online buys.
297
 Internationally, a number of countries 
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have responded to the threat of fake news, including Germany, which has 
required social media companies to delete hate speech,
298
 and France, which 
has proposed legislation that would empower judges to remove and block 




Recommendations. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the 
myriad responses to combat the spread and influence of disinformation 
online.
300
 It may be premature, in any event, to evaluate the 
constitutionality of responses that continue to evolve in a technological cat-
and-mouse game with the resources and sophistication of a foreign state,
301
 
especially given that the marketplace impact of such foreign manipulation 
is not sufficiently understood.
302
 But at least two responses seem consonant 
with First Amendment doctrine and functions and worth pursuing on top of 
any others that may also prove feasible and constitutional.  
First, at a minimum, online platforms should work to uncover speech 
affiliated with foreign states and disclose that affiliation to users. Platforms 
are already attempting to do so voluntarily,
303
 and most likely could be 
required to do so. While Citizens United generally barred discrimination on 
the basis of speaker identity,
304
 the majority’s reservation of that rule with 
respect to foreign speakers,
305
 coupled with the unanimous result in Bluman 
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upholding the ban on foreign political contributions,
306
 suggests that 
Keene’s earlier approval of a registration and labeling requirement for 
political speech from foreign powers
307
 remains a viable doctrinal source of 
support for similar or less restrictive disclosure requirements. Certainly, the 
constitutionality of applying the FEC’s narrower political and campaign ad 
disclosure requirements to online platforms
308
 does not seem in doubt after 
Citizens United broadly reaffirmed support for them.
309
  
Furthermore, the disclosure of political speech by foreign nations, 
particularly in the electoral context, seems consistent with the truth-seeking 
and self-governance functions of the First Amendment in “enabl[ing] the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages.”
310
 Speaker identity generally can be a valuable 
indicator to listeners of credibility, quality, knowledge, motivation, and 
reliability,
311
 and the identity of a foreign-state speaker can greatly impact 
each of these trust factors. At the same time, because foreign nations 
themselves do not possess any First Amendment interests
312
—including any 
anonymity, autonomy, or self-governance interests—compelling the 
disclosure of their identity would not impose any speaker-side harms to 
offset the benefits of disclosure to listeners. Moreover, those truth-seeking 
and self-governance benefits matter even more to the extent that, as 
Professor Helen Norton argues, there is less First Amendment value and 
greater harm in deliberate lies by foreign governments.
313
 But it remains to 
be seen whether voluntary or compelled disclosures could effectively ferret 
out the identities of sophisticated actors adept at obfuscating them, 
particularly given the sheer volume of potentially suspect content on major 
social platforms like Facebook.
314
  
Second, to paraphrase Uncle Ben, with great rights comes great 
responsibility.
315
 A robust right to receive foreign information and ideas 
arguably comes with a social duty to consume them with discernment. 
While it may be difficult to change the consumption preferences and trust 
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inclinations of the most avid adult consumers of fake news,
316
 “the 
processes of education” may “avert the evil” of “falsehood and fallacies” if 
offered earlier.
317
 A K-12 media literacy curriculum designed to teach 
students to critically assess the quality of content and the credibility of 
sources could give the next generation of the electorate the skills needed to 
grapple with increasingly complex streams of information at their 
disposal.
318
 That education could continue in college as an elective or as 
part of a core curriculum, and potentially beyond college as part of 
professional or continuing education offerings.
319
  
As noted, a number of states are considering or already creating media 
literacy education curricula.
320
 Other nations have started doing so as 
well.
321
 This early and ongoing prophylactic approach may not inoculate the 
nation against meddling in the next several election cycles, but it could 
prove more durable in the long run against continually evolving forms and 
modes of disinformation by improving the savviness of buyers in the 
marketplace of ideas.
322
 And educating listeners to better discern for 
themselves the value and veracity of the information and ideas that they 
consume from speakers worldwide furthers the truth-seeking, self-
governance, and self-realization ends of the First Amendment. 
VI. Conclusion 
A First Amendment right to receive information and ideas has gained 
doctrinal solidity and scope over the course of the past century. Outside of 
the campaign finance and physical border-crossing contexts, the robust 
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right now likely ensures uninhibited marketplace access to speech 
regardless of the foreign identity or location of the speaker and likely also 
extends to false political speech from abroad. As fate would have it, this 
right to receive information and ideas peaked at the same moment when 
massive social media networks such as Facebook offered the means for 
disseminating falsehoods far and wide, and a foreign adversary had the 
motive and sophistication to do so covertly during a closely contested 
presidential election.  
In the aftermath of this perfect free speech storm, it is an urgent, 
existential question whether our de facto free speech infrastructure should 
remain widely open to speech from abroad, particularly from foreign 
adversaries intent on weaponizing speech to sway electoral outcomes or 
sow social discord. This Article concludes that it is generally consistent 
with First Amendment precedents and functions to leave the electorate free 
to receive foreign information and ideas, and indeed essential to enjoy that 
exposure in matters of foreign policy and other issues of global concern. 
Further study is required, however, on the electoral and social effects of 
large-scale disinformation campaigns—such as Russia’s during the 2016 
election—before any firm conclusions can be drawn as to the desirability, 
efficacy, and constitutionality of restrictions on access to fake news and 
other falsehoods by foreign speakers.  
For the time being, without restricting the public’s access to foreign 
information and ideas, it is advisable at least to work toward technological 
and policy solutions for identifying and disclosing speech affiliated with 
foreign states. Furthermore, in addition to any other responses that might 
merit consideration against what are certain to be continually evolving 
operations to disrupt our domestic marketplace of ideas, teaching media 
literacy from grade school onward might yield an effective and durable 
long-term solution. It is also a solution that supports the truth-seeking, 
democracy-facilitating, and self-realizing functions of the First Amendment 
that underlay the right to receive information and ideas.  
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